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Beyond Baby M: International Perspectives on
Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of
the Unitary Biological Mother
Todd M. Krim*
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of new reproductive technologies, including
in-vitro fertilization and gestational surrogacy, continues to raise
complex legal and ethical issues.1 These "breakthroughs" in
noncoital reproduction go beyond merely forcing society to re-
consider traditional notions of family and parenthood. They
have so effectively dismembered the female reproductive role
that one can imagine at least three different scenarios resulting
in a complex custody dispute: (1) a woman may donate an egg
that, when fertilized, will be implanted in the uterus of another
woman who intends to raise the child; (2) the woman who pro-
* Todd M. Krim is an associate with the Los Angeles law firm of Konowiecki &
Rank, where he represents health care providers and managed care organizations in a
variety of corporate, regulatory, and transactional matters. He received his Juris Doc-
tor from The George Washington University National Law Center in Washington,
D.C., and his Master of Public Health, with a concentration in International Health
Policy, from The George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sci-
ences. Mr. Krim served as a law clerk with the American Psychological Association's
Office of Managed Care, and worked on the Presidential Task Force on National
Health Care Reform. Prior to entering law school, Mr. Krim worked in London, Eng-
land for CIGNA Services U.K. Limited, researching various issues relating to contrac-
tual arrangements between physicians, hospitals, and insurers in the United Kingdom
for CIGNA's preferred provider network.
The author wishes to thank Professor Marlena Valdez of The George Washington
University National Law Center for her substantive comments and editorial guidance,
and Master's Thesis Advisor Elayne Clift for her conceptual guidance and significant
assistance.
1. The use of in-vitro fertilization (IVF) in conjunction with surrogacy is one of
the more controversial applications of the new reproductive technologies, and the
subject of this article. The IVF process takes place in four primary stages over a
period of two weeks: ovulation induction, egg retrieval, fertilization, and embryo
transfer. Embryo transfer, the final stage of the process, involves transferring the
embryos into the uterus of the woman who will gestate the fetus to term. An egg
fertilized in-vitro is usually implanted in the uterus of the woman who produced it.
However, if the woman who produced the egg does not have a functioning uterus, the
embryos are transferred to a surrogate's uterus. This latter scenario is often referred
to as "gestational surrogacy."
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vides the egg may herself intend to raise the child carried to
term by another woman; or (3) a couple desiring a child may
arrange for a woman to gestate an embryo produced from both
a donated egg and a donated sperm.2 In this latter situation, the
newborn child has five potential parents: a sperm donor, an egg
provider, a woman who agrees to gestate the child, and two
nonbiologically related persons who intend to raise the child.
The new reproductive technologies, especially gestational sur-
rogacy, have already had a profound effect on the female's tradi-
tional reproductive role. "Gestational surrogacy" should not be
confused with the "traditional surrogacy" arrangement involved
in the infamous Baby M case, where the child a woman bears is
formed from her own egg. In gestational surrogacy arrange-
ments, one woman (the "gestational surrogate") agrees to be
impregnated with an embryo formed from the fertilized egg of
another woman (usually the child's "intended mother").
As the number of gestational surrogacy arrangements contin-
ues to grow, courts will increasingly be confronted with the diffi-
cult choice of deciding who is the legal mother of a child born
from a gestational surrogacy arrangement: the woman from
whose egg the child developed and without whose desire the
child would not exist, or the dedicated woman who chose to
carry the child for nine months. At the same time, the failure of
state legislatures and/or Congress to pass a uniform law address-
ing such arrangements will lead to further inconsistent and con-
flicting court rulings Finally, the inadequate monitoring and
regulation of fertility clinics will permit infertile couples to be
taken advantage of, resulting in new legal issues for courts and
legislatures to address. For instance, in July 1995, three physi-
cians affiliated with the Center for Reproductive Health at the
University of California (UC), Irvine, including two fertility pio-
neers, were charged with unauthorized research on unconsent-
ing subjects and with transferring eggs and embryos from
unconsenting donors to other women.' In what may be one of
2. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 790 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting), aff'g
sub nom. Anna J. v. Mark C., 28 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter
Johnson 1I].
3. In the usual gestational surrogacy arrangement, the intended mother's egg is
artificially united with her husband's sperm and implanted in the gestational surro-
gate's uterus, who then carries the child to term. However, another variation of gesta-
tional surrogacy involves the use of a sperm and an egg from anonymous donors
rather than from the intended parents.
4. Diane M. Gianeli, Fertility Scandal Raises Call for Regulation, AM. MED.
NEWS, Sept. 11, 1995, at 3.
[Vol. 5
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the largest fertility scandals to date, it is estimated that at least
sixty patients treated at fertility clinics at UC Irvine, UC San
Diego, and AMI/Garden Grove Medical Center were subjected
to improper egg and embryo transfers, with as many as eight
children born as a result of the improper transfers. In less than
two months, seventeen scandal-related legal claims involving
UC had been filed, many of which pit the egg and embryo do-
nors against their respective recipients. At least one couple
whose embryos were allegedly stolen and implanted in a New-
port Beach woman who gave birth to twins have requested
DNA testing of the youngsters to establish their biological ori-
gin.5 The UC fertility clinic scandal follows the 1992 conviction
of a Virginia fertility doctor, also considered a shining star for
his pioneering work with amniocentesis, for using his own sperm
to inseminate infertility patients. 6
The United States is not alone in its problems. Other coun-
tries have responded in a variety of ways; while some countries
are studying the issues, others have decided to prohibit gesta-
tional surrogacy, some to regulate it, and some to ignore it. Of
concern is the threat of women, men, eggs, and sperm traveling
all over the world to take advantage of various laws or lack
thereof, creating havoc, let alone choice of law questions that
can boggle the mind. However, the greatest concern is the po-
tential for a "black market" preying on people's emotional or
financial needs.
This article examines gestational surrogacy and in-vitro fertili-
zation (IVF) from both a legal perspective, analyzing various
state, federal, and international laws, as well as an ethical stand-
point, confronting the unique controversies these new techno-
logical advancements present to our society. Part I reviews a
recent gestational surrogacy case, 7 and examines the various ap-
proaches a court can take to determine whether the gestational
surrogate or the egg provider is the child's "legal" mother.8 Part
II surveys state and federal legislative activity regarding surro-
5. Julie Marquis, Silent Fear Lies Behind Fertility Furor, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995,
at A3.
6. Gianelli, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Johnson I1, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
8. As the California Court of Appeals noted in Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal Rptr.
369, 371 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), aff'g sub nor. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X 63 31 90
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1990) [hereinafter Johnson I1]: "Surrogacy is an issue where the basic
terms one employs may affect one's analysis." I have therefore attempted to refrain,
insofar as possible, from using the terms "mother," "father," or "parent(s)" when
referring to the parties in these arrangements.
1996]
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gacy. In particular, this section takes an in-depth look at the
comprehensive regulatory schemes of various states as they at-
tempt to create certainty for the parties involved in surrogacy
arrangements. Part III examines the international aspects of
IVF and surrogacy, beginning with a review of current and pro-
posed legislation in other countries. This section also explores
the troubling phenomenon of transcontinental surrogacy agree-
ments as part of an emerging international surrogacy industry.
Part IV explores selected feminist perspectives on the new re-
productive technologies. Inclusion of such views is useful in
conveying the impassioned arguments both for and against these
new forms of reproduction. Finally, in Part V, the article con-
cludes with a recommended approach for resolving the complex
issues raised by the new reproductive technologies. This section
includes a call for the federal government to pass comprehen-
sive legislation governing gestational surrogacy and more strin-
gent regulation of the growing reproductive technology field.
I. JOHNSON V. CAL VERT AND THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS
Although the first reported birth of a child by a gestational
surrogate dates back to 1984, it was not until 1990 that Califor-
nia became the first state to address such arrangements in court.
The custody dispute between Anna Johnson and Mark and Cris-
pina Calvert eventually made its way through all levels of the
California state court system. The trial court,9 the California
Court of Appeals, 10 and the California Supreme Court1 all con-
cluded that Crispina Calvert, not Anna Johnson, was the child's
"natural mother" under California law. However, the three
courts used significantly different approaches in determining
which of the two women was the child's mother. A review of
the facts of the case, each court's reasoning in the Johnson v.
Calvert case, and the advantages and disadvantages associated
with it, is instructive for courts that will inevitably have to re-
solve similar issues in the future.
9. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X 63 31 90 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990) [hereinafter Johnson
1].
10. Johnson II, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
11. Johnson III, 851 P.2d at 785.
[Vol. 5
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A. The Facts
Mark and Crispina Calvert, a mixed Caucasian-Filipino
couple, had long desired to have their own genetically related
child. 12 As a result of tumors in Crispina's uterus, however, she
was forced to have a hysterectomy, the surgical removal of the
uterus. While the operation rendered Crispina unable to carry a
child, she was still able to produce eggs, and the Calverts began
to consider surrogacy.
In 1989, an African American woman named Anna Johnson
heard about the couple's plight and volunteered to serve as a
surrogate for them. Anna, a licensed vocational nurse who
worked at the same hospital as Crispina, was a single parent of a
three-year-old daughter of her own, and needed the extra
money.
On January 15, 1990, Mark, Crispina, and Anna signed a sur-
rogacy agreement. According to the agreement, Mark's sperm
and Crispina's eggs would be fertilized to produce an embryo,
which would then be carried by Anna. The agreement also stip-
ulated, in favor of Mark and Crispina, that Anna would relin-
quish "all parental rights" to the child born so that the child
would be taken into the Calverts' home "as their child." In re-
turn for Anna's efforts, the Calverts would pay her $10,000 in a
series of installments, the last to be six weeks after the child's
birth. Mark and Crispina also agreed to take out a $200,000 in-
surance policy on Anna's life.
On January 19, 1990, the zygote, formed in-vitro from Cris-
pina's ovum and Mark's sperm, was implanted in Anna's uterus.
An ultrasound test performed less than one month later con-
firmed that Anna was pregnant. This pregnancy, however,
turned out to be much more difficult than her previous one.
Anna experienced vomiting in excess of normal morning sick-
ness, and at one point had to be hospitalized with severe
dehydration.
As the pregnancy proceeded, relations between Anna and the
Calverts slowly began to deteriorate. Anna was upset that Mark
and Crispina failed to obtain the life insurance policy pursuant
to their agreement. She also felt abandoned during an onset of
premature labor in June. The Calverts were disturbed to learn
that Anna had not disclosed to them that she had experienced
12. This scenario is based on the real-life events as recounted by the court in John-
son II, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
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several miscarriages and stillbirths in the past. Finally, Anna
sent a letter to the Calverts demanding the balance of the pay-
ments due her so that she could pay her rent.13  Anna
threatened to breach their agreement and refuse to give up the
child if the Calverts did not comply.
In August, the Calverts filed a lawsuit seeking enforcement of
the contract and a declaration that they were the legal parents of
the unborn child. Anna filed her own lawsuit seeking to invali-
date the contract and to be declared the mother of the child.
The two cases were eventually consolidated and the child,
named Christopher, was born on September 19, 1990. Blood
samples were immediately obtained from both Anna and Chris-
topher for analysis. By excluding Anna as a genetic contributor,
the results indicated that Mark and Crispina were the child's
parents.
13. The text of the letter reads:
7/23/90
Dear Chris & Mark:
I am writing you this letter to inquire if an early payment can be made of
what is left to be paid of me. I would not ask if it weren't important and I
feel that this is important because it deals with the well-being of the baby.
The lady that owns the house in which I reside is selling it, so I must be out
by the 10th of August. Since I am to be hospitalized for three weeks due to
the pyelonephritis [sic] & premature contractions I need to find another
place to live prior to this! Due to the complications of this pregnancy, I am
unable to work until the delivery of this baby so my income is limited. I do
not get enough from disability to make a two month rent deposit plus, the
security deposit & have the telephone reconnected. I don't think you'd want
your child jeopardized by living out on the street. I have looked out for this
child's well being thus far, is it asking too much to look after ours? I'm
imploring nicely and trying not to be an ogre about this. But you must ad-
mit, you have not been very supportive mentally the entire pregnancy &
you've showed a lack of interest unless it came to an ultrasound. I am asking
you for help in paying off the final five thousand. There's only two months
left & once this baby is born, my hands are free of this deal. But see, this
situation can go two ways. One, you can pay me the entire sum early so I
won't have to live in the streets, or two you can forget about helping me but,
calling it a breach of contract & not get the baby! I don't want it to get this
nasty, not coming this far, but you'd want some help too, if you had no
where to go & have to worry about not only yourself but your own child &
the child of someone else!!! Help me find another place & get settled in
before your baby's born.
This is the only letter you will get from me. The next letter you will receive
will be from my lawyers, unless I hear from you by return mail at the end of
the week-7/28/90.
Sincerely,
Anna [last name omitted]
Surrogate
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B. The Trial Court and the Genetic Maternity Rule
Focusing on the biological ties between the Calverts and the
child, trial court Judge Richard N. Parslow, Jr., concluded that
the Calverts were the child's genetic, biological, and natural
mother and father, and that Anna had "no parental rights to the
child."' 4 Judge Parslow also summarily dismissed the idea that
both Anna and Crispina could be found to be the child's
mothers: "I think a three-parent, two-natural-mom claim in a
situation is ripe for crazy making .... -15
For the trial court, the critical difference between Anna John-
son and Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate in the Baby M
case, 16 was the fact that Anna is not genetically related to the
child she bore. According to Judge Parslow, "who we are and
what we are ... is a combination of genetic factors. We know
more and more about traits now, how you walk, talk and every-
thing else, all sorts of things that develop out of your genes, how
long you're going to live, all things being equal, when your im-
mune system is going to break down, what diseases you may be
14. Johnson I, No. X 63 31 90 at 4-5, 14 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990). For comments on
the trial court opinion, see George J. Annas, Crazy Making: Embryos and Gestational
Mothers, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 35 (1991).
15. Id. at 36 (reporting the oral opinion rendered from the bench).
16. In Baby M, William Stem and Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogacy
contract. The contract provided that Mrs. Whitehead was to be artificially insemi-
nated with Mr. Stem's sperm, become pregnant, carry the child to term, bear it, de-
liver it to Mr. Stem and his wife Elizabeth, and "thereafter do what was necessary to
terminate her maternal rights so that Mrs. Stem could thereafter adopt the child." In
the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (NJ. 1988). Mrs. Whitehead subsequently
changed her mind and wanted to keep the child. The Stems brought suit seeking to
enforce the surrogacy contract, to compel surrender of the child, and to terminate
Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights to allow adoption of the child by Mrs. Stem. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to enforce the surrogacy contract, holding in-
stead that the contract conflicted with several New Jersey laws including a law prohib-
iting the use of money in connection with adoption, and a law requiring proof of
parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights. The court
also held that the best interests of the child justified awarding custody to Mr. and Mrs.
Stem, but that Mrs. Whitehead was entitled to visitation rights. Id. at 1263.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also emphasized the extremely sensitive and
controversial issues raised by the artificial insemination of a surrogate mother:
The unfortunate events that have unfolded illustrate that its unregulated use
can bring suffering to all involved. Potential victims include the surrogate
mother and her family, the natural father and his wife, and most importantly,
the child. Although surrogacy has apparently provided positive results for
some infertile couples, it can also, as this case demonstrates, cause suffering
to participants, here essentially innocent and well-intended.
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susceptible to."'1 7 Thus, the trial court concluded that Crispina
alone was to be considered the mother of the child:
Anna Johnson is the gestational carrier of the child, a host in a
sense .... [S]he and the child are genetic hereditary strangers
.... Anna's relationship to the child is analogous to that of a
foster parent providing care, protection, and nurture during
the period of time that the natural mother, Crispina Calvert,
was unable to care for the child.18
By focusing on genetics, the trial court suggested that each
person's individuality is determined by genetics, and, therefore,
the egg provider has a higher claim to rear and make decisions
for a child than the gestational surrogate/"host."19
Judge Parslow attempted to bolster his opinion by referencing
scientific studies of twins that indicated that approximately sev-
enty percent of observed variation in IQ was attributable to ge-
netic variation.2 ° Commentators such as George J. Annas
suggest, however, that the same studies can also be used to dis-
pute the contention that custody should be awarded to the
child's genetic parents: "If genetics determines 70 percent of our
IQ and most of our psychological makeup, regardless of the type
of home environment we are raised in within Western middle-
class society, then it becomes very difficult to make a 'best inter-
ests' of the child argument .... The child will likely do as well
with any parents, because the child's genes, rather than its envi-
ronment, will determine its future."'2 1 Accordingly, genes should
not be the basis for determining what is, or is not, in the child's
best interests.
There are several additional criticisms of the trial court's focus
on genetics to determine motherhood. It has been suggested
that a policy of extending greater rights and responsibilities to
individuals solely because of their genetic linkage reinforces the
stigma of adoption and tends to provide incentives for de-adop-
tion litigation. Furthermore, there is a fear that such a policy
might eventually lead to state-recognized eugenics programs.22
17. Johnson I, No. X 63 31 90 at 7-8.
18. Annas, supra note 14, at 36 (reporting the oral opinion rendered from the
bench).
19. Id. at 37.
20. Johnson I, No. X 63 31 90 at 7. See also Annas, supra note 14, at 37 (citing
Thomas J. Bouchard et al., Sources of Human Psychological Differences: The Minne-
sota Study of Twins Reared-Apart, 250 SCIENCE 223, 228 (1990).
21. Annas, supra note 14, at 37.
22. BRUCE LORD WILDER, DEFINING THE LEGAL PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
IN ALTERNATIVE REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1, 6 (1991) (admonishing a critical
[Vol. 5
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The trial court's opinion also has far-reaching implications for
the increasingly popular gamete and embryo donation programs
that are implemented in fertility clinics across the country. It is
not uncommon for women unable to produce their own eggs to
use the genetic material (egg or embryo) of a donor and then
carry the fetuses themselves. Implementing the trial court's
analysis, however, the donor (not the intended mother) would
be considered the resulting child's mother, despite the fact that
the intended mother had gestated the child for nine months.
Consequently, the only solution would be for the donor, who is
often anonymous, to relinquish all parental rights after the
child's birth so as to allow the intended parent to adopt the
child.23 Many states have rectified this problem by enacting Ar-
tificial Insemination by Donor (AID) statutes that grant paren-
tal rights to the rearing parents if the donor is anonymous and a
physician performed the insemination procedure. Most AID
statutes, however, only address sperm donation, and, thus, do
not provide much guidance in the gestational surrogacy context.
Accordingly, only five states have enacted laws that specifically
address the subject of egg donation.24 These laws generally es-
tablish the gestational surrogate as the sole legal mother, except
in cases of lawful surrogacy.25
Finally, the trial court's exclusive focus on genetics as a way to
determine parentage also raises tort law implications. For in-
stance, in many states, a pregnant woman is either immune or
consideration of the "advisability of a constitutional amendment prohibiting laws and
government involvement which seek to establish or promote a particular quality of
genetic composition over others by vesting it with greater rights or powers, or which
favor legal relationships between some at the expense of others, solely because of
genetic linkages").
23. Karen A. Bussel, Adventures in Babysitting: Gestational Surrogate Mother Tort
Liability, 41 DUKE L.J. 661, 666-67 (1991) (arguing that "[t]he status of gamete and
embryo donation, as well as of traditional surrogate arrangements, is affected by such
a restrictive definition of parenthood.").
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.11, 742.13-742.17 (West 1986 & Supp.1996); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 554, 555 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 151.102, 151.103
(West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (Michie 1995).
25. See Daniel S. Strouse, Egg Donation, Motherhood and State Law Reform: A
Commentary on Professor Palmer's Proposals, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 31 (1994). Profes-
sor Palmer suggested that "both the genetic and gestational mothers should be al-
lowed to assert parental rights." Id. at 31. He proposed that state legislation should
name the genetic mother, the egg donor, as the sole mother of an IVF child. Id. at 32.
However, this rule could be overcome "by a testator's or donor's expression of 'a
contrary intention'; by formal adoption or judicial decree establishing the birth
mother as the sole mother .... Id.
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exempted from tort liability for certain harms caused to her
child during the pregnancy. Under the parental immunity doc-
trine, although a tort has been committed, liability will be ex-
cused because of the existence of a parent-child relationship.26
However, using the trial court's analysis, since a gestational sur-
rogate is not considered the parent of the fetus she carries, she
"may be liable in tort for any injuries to the fetus that occur as a
result of her behavior during [the pregnancy]. 27
In contrast to the above arguments, there are many commen-
tators who favor a genetic determination of motherhood in sur-
rogacy cases. They argue that making genetics the primary
determinant of maternal rights is preferable to a contract-based
approach because reliance on contract principles "seems to
merge the family with the world of business and commerce, to
define family relations as negotiable ties between otherwise un-
connected, autonomous individuals. '28 Advocates of genetic de-
termination also argue that focusing on genetics avoids any
potential conflict with laws proscribing baby selling: the egg pro-
vider is the legal mother of the baby so she cannot buy what is
already hers. Finally, proponents of the genetic test for mater-
nity also claim that recognition of the importance of genetics in
parent-child relationships furthers the best interests of the child
by reducing the possibility of confusion over one's identity and
genetic heritage. The genetic test for maternity, it is argued,
"promote[s] continuity and security for the children over time,"
and provides a rapid and clear solution to legal conflicts because
such a test would allow surrogate gestation to continue, without
a need to approve surrogacy contracts.29
C. The California Court of Appeals and the Uniform
Parentage Act
Upon review of the trial court's decision in Johnson v. Calvert,
the California Court of Appeals addressed three issues: (1) the
legal parentage of the child, (2) Anna Johnson's due process
claims, and (3) Anna's equal protection issues. The court re-
26. Bussel, supra note 23, at 667.
27. Id.
28. Jeffrey M. Place, Gestational Surrogacy and the Meaning of "Mother": Johnson
v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 907 (1994) (quoting
Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 673 (1993)).
29. Alice Hofheiner, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling Parentage Law and Surro-
gacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. & Soc. CHANGE 571, 602 (1992).
[Vol. 5202
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fused, however, to address whether the surrogacy agreement
was enforceable under California law.30
Justice Sills, who wrote the opinion for the California Court of
Appeals, resolved the question of legal parentage by applying
the state's version of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). 31
Judge Sills noted that the California legislature enacted the UPA
to replace the concept of illegitimacy with the concept of parent-
age.32 Most state legislatures, including the California legisla-
ture, never intended the UPA to govern the issues that could
result from new reproductive technologies, such as gestational
surrogacy.33 Nevertheless, since the UPA was the only statutory
guidance for California courts struggling with the issue of par-
entage determination, the courts used it to resolve parental dis-
putes arising from surrogacy agreements.
The appellate court focused on certain definitions found in
the UPA. The UPA begins by defining the "parent and child
relationship" as a "legal relationship" that could exist between a
child and the child's natural or adoptive parents.34 This relation-
ship "extends equally to every child and to every parent, regard-
less of the marital status of the parents. 35
According to the court, the UPA creates two ways for a wo-
man to establish the existence of a mother and child relation-
ship: one is by presenting proof of having given birth to the
child, and the other is by presenting proof of a genetic relation-
ship to the child through blood test evidence. 36 Therefore, it
would appear that Anna Johnson, having given birth to Christo-
30. Johnson 1I, 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "[i]t is
one thing for a court to decide whether a contract violates public policy, articulated in
the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions over a period of many years. It is
another for a court to decide a contract violates public policy made of whole cloth in a
case of first impression.").
31. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (now codified at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730
(West 1994 & Supp. 1996)). Note that this recodification was enacted without any
substantive changes to the text of the UPA.
32. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Cal. 1992).
33. The UPA has been adopted in 18 states: Alabama, California, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming.
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001 (now codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (West 1994
& Supp. 1996)).
35. Id. at § 7002 (now codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7602 (West 1994 & Supp.
1996)).
36. Id. at § 7003(1) (now codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 1994 &
Supp. 1996)) (between a child and the natural mother, a parent and child relationship
"may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or under [the
Act]").
1996]
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pher, possessed a statutory claim under the UPA to be his natu-
ral mother. Yet the court noted that the UPA also permits "any
interested party" to bring an action to determine the existence
or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship. 37 In this re-
gard, the court found that provisions of the UPA addressing the
establishment of a father and child relationship through blood
test evidence were also relevant to the establishment of a
mother and child relationship.
While blood tests cannot absolutely prove paternity, they can
unequivocally prove a man is not the father of a child.38 In the
instant case, the blood test results proved that Anna Johnson
was not genetically related to Christopher and she offered no
evidence to the contrary. In fact, Anna Johnson stipulated that
Crispina Calvert was genetically related to the child.39 There-
fore, both Anna and Crispina met the UPA's statutory defini-
tion of the child's "natural mother": Anna by giving birth to the
child, and Crispina by her genetic relationship to the child.
However, the California Court of Appeals did not read the
UPA so as to give both Anna and Crispina statutory claims to
maternity. Instead, the court found the blood test determina-
tion of maternity to be dispositive. The court stated that under
California law, "Anna [was] conclusively not the 'natural
mother' when her maternity [was] ruled out by blood tests."4 °
Under the court's interpretation of the UPA, a woman must first
demonstrate through blood test evidence that she is genetically
related to the child before she can be considered the child's
"natural mother" by virtue of having given birth to the child.
Accordingly, since Anna could not establish through blood test
evidence that she was genetically related to Christopher, she did
not satisfy the UPA's definition of "natural mother." The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals therefore concluded that Crispina, not
Anna, was the child's "natural mother" under the UPA.4 1
Although the Court of Appeals found that California law
does not grant Anna any parental rights, the court still had to
address whether, by virtue of giving birth to the child, Anna was
entitled to be recognized as the child's "parent" as a matter of
37. Id. at § 7015 (emphasis added) (now codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650
(West 1994 & Supp. 1996)).
38. See Cramer v. Morrison, 153 Cal. Rpt. 865, 869-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
39. Johnson I, 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
40. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
41. Id. This interpretation of the California law was quite dubious and, as the
California Supreme Court later held, incorrect.
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constitutional law. In support of this contention, Anna focused
on the significant biological contribution a woman gives a child
when she carries the child to term.
With respect to Anna's substantive due process claims, the
Court of Appeals found that she lacked a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with the
child. Referring to Justice Scalia's analysis in Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., the court emphasized that "[o]ur society has never 'tradi-
tionally protected' the right of a gestational surrogate. '42
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals found that even if a court
concluded that unwed fathers had a liberty interest based, at
least in part, on a biological relationship to the child, this rea-
soning would not apply to Anna because she was not Christo-
pher's "natural" mother. Rather, for due process purposes,
Mark and Crispina were the child's natural parents and "[t]o
hold that Anna ha[d] a liberty interest in her relationship with
the child was to diminish the liberty interest of Mark and Cris-
pina in their relationship with the child. 43
Addressing Anna's equal protection claims, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the application of the UPA to determine
maternity as well as paternity did not conflict with the state or
federal constitutions. Judge Sills found no gender discrimina-
tion in applying the same standard to determine motherhood
and fatherhood. The court also stated that to the extent the
UPA makes a distinction between two classes of women, that
distinction was rational and not arbitrary, "even if one be-
lieve[d] the choice unwise." 4 In support of the distinction, the
court referred to evidence introduced at trial that demonstrated
that "the whole process of human development is 'set in motion
by the genes.' "45 In addition, while claiming not to detract from
the relationship between adoptive parents and their children,
the court noted that "genetics is a powerful factor in human re-
42. Id. at 379. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-24 (1989), the
Supreme Court describes the types of liberties historically protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause. It addressed the issue of whether an unwed father has a constitutionally
protected "liberty interest" in maintaining a relationship with a biological child born
out of an adulterous affair. Justice Scalia's lead opinion looked to societal traditions
to conclude there was no such interest. "The court explained [that] the relationship
between an adulterous natural father, his married paramour and their child has never
been recognized as a 'protected family unit under the historic practices of our soci-
ety.' " Johnson H, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (citing 491 U.S. at 123-25).
43. Johnson H, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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lationships," and that "[h]eredity can provide a basis of connec-
tion between two individuals for the duration of their lives." 6
D. The California Supreme Court and Intent-Based
Parenthood
The California Supreme Court granted review of the Court of
Appeals opinion and affirmed the lower courts' conclusions that
Crispina Calvert, not Anna Johnson, was the "natural mother."
The court's opinion became the first ruling by any state's high
court to uphold a surrogacy agreement. 47
Although both the California Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals agreed that the blood test provisions of the UPA ap-
plied to maternity as well as paternity disputes, they interpreted
and applied the UPA quite differently. While Justice Sills, writ-
ing for the Court of Appeals, found that the decisive blood test
"end[ed] the matter,"'48 Justice Panelli, writing for the Supreme
Court, concluded that the UPA provided two ways in which a
woman could establish a parent and child relationship: (1) by
evidence that she gave birth to the child, or (2) by evidence that
she was genetically related to the child.4 9  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court concluded that both Anna and Crispina
presented acceptable proof of maternity under the UPA.
46. Id. at 380-81.
47. Johnson 11, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). In November 1994, a probate court
in Ohio became the second state court to uphold a gestational surrogacy agreement.
See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ct. C.P. 1994). In Belsito, the court granted
a married couple's declaratory judgment request that they be declared the genetic and
natural parents of a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement. The
court also granted the parent's request to have the birth certificate reflect the legiti-
mate status of the child as their son. Specifically, the court ruled that "when a child is
delivered by a gestational surrogate who has been impregnated through [IVF]," those
individuals who are genetically related to the child will be deemed the natural parents
of the child under Ohio law. Id. at 66. If these individuals have "not relinquished or
waived their rights to assume the legal status of natural parents, they shall be consid-
ered the 'natural and legal parents' of that child." Id. Unlike the Johnson case, how-
ever, the gestational mother in Belsito was the genetic mother's younger sister, and
she did not assert parental rights over the child.
48. Johnson II, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
49. Johnson III, 851 P.2d at 780-81. The California Supreme Court stated:
We disagree with the Court of Appeal's reading of the statute. In our view,
the term 'natural' as used in subdivision (1) of Civil Code section 7003 sim-
ply refers to a mother who is not an adoptive mother. Section 7003 does not
purport to answer the question before us, i.e., who is to be deemed the natu-
ral mother when the biological functions essential to bringing a child into the
world have been allocated between two women.
Id. at 781 n.9.
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Despite a recommendation by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) that the court conclude that the child had two
mothers, the court held that California law recognized only one
natural mother.50 Accordingly, the court found itself confronted
with the difficult task of having to determine which of the two
women, the egg provider or the gestational surrogate, was the
child's "natural mother" under California law.
The California Supreme Court broke the "tie" between the
two women by looking to the parties' intentions as manifested in
the surrogacy agreement. In support of its reliance on the intent
of the parties, the court reasoned that "while all of the players in
the procreative arrangement are necessary in bringing a child
into the world, the child would not have been born but for the
efforts of the intended parents."'51 The court also asserted that
"[t]he mental concept of the child is a controlling factor of its
creation, and the originators of that concept [in other words, the
intended parents] merit full credit as conceivers. '' 52 Finally, af-
ter considering the expectations of the parties to the surrogacy
agreement, the court stated that "the interests of children, par-
ticularly at the outset of their lives, are '[un]likely to run con-
trary to those of adults who choose to bring them into being. 53
Thus, the court concluded
that although the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity
and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one wo-
man, she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she in-
tended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under Cali-
fornia law.54
The California Supreme Court rejected Anna's contention
that surrogacy violated the state's public policies. In particular,
Anna argued that a surrogacy agreement constituted a pre-birth
waiver of her parental rights that directly contravened Califor-
50. Id. at 781 n.8 (stating that "[e]ven though rising divorce rates have made mul-
tiple parent arrangements common in our society, we see no compelling reason to
recognize such a situation here").
51. Id. at 782 (quoting John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"?: The
Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 415 (1991)
(emphasis within original)).
52. Id. at 783 (quoting Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Repro-
ductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196 (1986)).
53. Id. (quoting Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297.
54. Id. at 782.
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nia adoption law prohibiting monetary payment in return for re-
linquishing parental rights. Justice Panelli held, however, that
gestational surrogacy was different than adoption in several re-
spects and should therefore not be subject to adoption laws. In
particular, Justice Panelli noted that in gestational surrogacy ar-
rangements, the parties voluntarily agree to participate in IVF
and related medical procedures before the child is conceived. In
addition, the payments to the surrogate under the contract are
"meant to compensate her for her services in gestating the fetus
and undergoing labor, rather than for giving up 'parental' rights
to the child. 55
E. The Dissenting View and the "Best Interests of the
Child" Standard
In Justice Kennard's dissent to the California Supreme Court
opinion, she criticized the majority's reliance upon the "intent"
of the egg provider as the determinant factor in resolving the
issue of maternity.5 6 Justice Kennard argued that such a test was
not flexible enough to deal with unforeseen circumstances, and
would always favor the egg provider over the gestational surro-
gate. As Justice Kennard noted, the majority opinion, which
contained no procedural protections for any of the parties to a
surrogacy arrangement, was in effect "a sweeping endorsement
of unregulated gestational surrogacy. ' '57 In addition, the major-
ity's approach, according to Justice Kennard, devalued the sub-
stantial claims of motherhood by a gestational surrogate whose
biological contribution of carrying a child for nine months and
giving birth was as much an assumption of parental responsibil-
ity as the decision by a genetic contributor to enter into a surro-
gacy arrangement. Finally, Justice Kennard argued that "[a]
pregnant woman intending to bring a child into the world is
more than a mere container or breeding animal; she is a con-
scious agent of creation no less than the genetic mother, and her
humanity is implicated on a deep level. Her role should not be
devalued. ' 58 In fact, case studies found in medical literature
suggested that a gestational surrogate significantly contributed
to the biological structure of the baby through her hormonal
55. Id. at 784.
56. Id. at 788-89 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 798 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 797-98 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
208 [Vol. 5
16
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 5 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 10
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol5/iss1/10
Gestational Surrogacy
material, and that a psychological bond, between the surrogate
and the baby, began long before the child was born.5 9
Instead of focusing on the intent of the egg provider as the
sole criterion for determining motherhood, Justice Kennard fa-
vored a standard that would give greater consideration and pro-
tection to the child born of a surrogacy arrangement. This
standard, commonly known as the "best interests of the child"
standard, is often used in traditional child welfare disputes, such
as custody, adoption, and visitation matters. Protection of the
minor child is the foremost consideration under this approach,
and there are several factors courts consider in making this de-
termination. In particular, courts consider the ability of the pro-
spective parent(s) to nurture the child physically and
psychologically and to provide ethical and intellectual guidance.
The "best interests" standard also tends to de-emphasize the rel-
ative economic circumstances of the parties involved, which
under an intent standard will almost always favor the egg pro-
vider and her spouse. Under a "best interests" standard, the
intent of the parties may also be a factor, but certainly not a
decisive one.
In sum, the California courts have attempted to resolve the
parentage determination issue by using very different ap-
proaches. While there are advantages and disadvantages associ-
ated with each, the "intent-based parenthood" approach used by
the California Supreme Court arguably creates the most cer-
tainty for parties entering into gestational surrogacy arrange-
ments. Until the California legislature chooses to enact
legislation to the contrary, the California Supreme Court's ap-
proach to resolving gestational surrogacy disputes remains the
governing law in California.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTORY RESPONSES
As the Johnson v. Calvert case clearly demonstrates, courts
have a difficult time resolving surrogacy-related custody dis-
putes. State and federal legislators have faced similar problems,
and they must decide whether they should even attempt to regu-
late this arguably private right of surrogacy, and, if so, to what
extent. These questions have not been, and will not be, easy to
answer.
59. See generally Ebrahim J. Kermani, Issues of Child Custody and Our Moral
Values in the Era of New Medical Technology, 31 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 536 (1992).
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A. State Legislative Responses to Surrogate Motherhood
State legislatures, slow to respond to the new reproductive
technologies, have only just begun to address the difficult issues
raised by surrogacy. The approach taken by each state can vary
significantly: one state may have a blanket prohibition of surro-
gacy agreements, while a neighboring state may recognize and
enforce them. Most state statutes do not distinguish traditional
surrogacy arrangements from gestational surrogacy
arrangements.
Since 1987, nearly half of the states have enacted legislation
addressing surrogate parenting arrangements. 60 Legislatures in
Arizona, Indiana, New York, North Dakota, and Utah have re-
sponded to the call for legislative guidance by making all surro-
gacy contracts void and unenforceable. Other states, including
Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington, have passed
legislation that voids only those surrogacy contracts entered into
for compensation.
Michigan goes further than most other states by criminalizing
surrogacy. Under the Michigan statute, facilitators of surrogacy
contracts are guilty of a felony and punishable by a fine of up to
$50,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.61 Even par-
ticipants are guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine
of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up to one year.62
Florida, New Hampshire, and Virginia are in the clear minor-
ity by making certain noncommercial surrogacy arrangements
legal and enforceable. All three states prohibit couples from
compensating the surrogate in excess of any expenses incurred
as a result of the pregnancy, and provide the surrogate with an
opportunity to rescind the contract. In addition, all three states
60. ALA. CODE §§ 26-10A-33 to 26-10A-34 (1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
218 (1991 & Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-201 to 9-10-202 (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.14-742.17 (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-8-2-1 to 31-8-2-3 (West 1979 & Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 199.590(2), 199.590(4), 199.990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851 to 722.863 (West 1993);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 168-B:32 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.J.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-41, 9:17-44 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§§ 121-124 (Consol. 1993 & Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07
(1991 & Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 109.239, 109.243, 109.247 (1990 &
Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-
165 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210 to 26.26.260 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16 (1993).
61. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.857 (West 1993).
62. Id. at § 722.859 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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expressly address gestational surrogacy arrangements. Beyond
these common characteristics, however, their approaches to reg-
ulating surrogacy are quite distinct.
The Florida statute has several requirements designed to pro-
tect the participants of a gestational surrogacy arrangement.
Specifically, the gestational surrogacy contract will not be en-
forceable unless: (1) the intended parents (who must be legally
married) and the gestational surrogate are eighteen years of age
or older; and (2) a physician determines that (a) the intended
mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term, (b) the
gestation will cause a risk to her physical health, or (c) the gesta-
tion will cause a risk to the health of the fetus. The intended
parents may compensate the gestational surrogate for reason-
able living, legal, medical, psychological, and psychiatric ex-
penses that are directly related to prenatal, intrapartal, and
postpartal periods. Finally, the gestational surrogate's agree-
ment to relinquish parental rights is subject to a right of rescis-
sion within seven days of the child's birth.3
New Hampshire's statute provides a more comprehensive reg-
ulatory scheme than Florida's, including judicial preauthoriza-
tion of gestational surrogacy contracts. Under New Hampshire
law, only judicially preauthorized surrogacy contracts are recog-
nized. In order for the surrogacy contract to be preapproved by
a court: (1) the participants must have given their informed con-
sent; (2) evaluations and counseling must have been completed;
(3) the contract must not contain any prohibited or unconscion-
able terms; and (4) the contract must be in the best interests of
the intended child.64 All court-approved surrogacy contracts
must also give the gestational mother an unqualified right of re-
scission at any time up to seventy-two hours after the birth of
the child. If the gestational surrogate exercises her rights to
keep the child, and parental rights of the commissioning couple
are terminated, the obligation to provide financial support is
also terminated. If the gestational surrogate does not exercise
her rights to keep the child, her parental rights will automati-
cally terminate and those rights will be vested in the intended
parents.65 Finally, New Hampshire does not allow any entity to
promote or solicit any party to enter into a surrogacy arrange-
ment for compensation.
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1996).
64. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:16 to 168-B:23 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
65. Id. at § 168-B:25 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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The Virginia surrogacy statute, like New Hampshire's, has a
more extensive regulatory scheme than Florida's. However, un-
like New Hampshire, Virginia recognizes two general types of
surrogacy agreements: those that have been judicially
preauthorized, and those that have not. In order for a surrogacy
contract to be judicially preauthorized, the gestational mother
must be married and have had at least one successful pregnancy,
and all parties (including the gestational surrogate's husband)
must sign the contract.66 Both the intended child and the gesta-
tional surrogate are entitled to legal counsel during the petition
phase of the process.
Before the court will approve the contract, however, a home
study of the intended parents, the surrogate, and her husband
must be conducted. All interested parties must meet the stan-
dards of fitness applicable to adoptive parents, and, like the
New Hampshire statute, the Virginia statute requires all parties
to undergo physical and psychological examinations and coun-
seling. Finally, the intended mother must be either infertile or
unable to bear children without unreasonable risk of mental or
physical harm to herself or the unborn child, and at least one of
the intended parents must be genetically related to the unborn
child.6
7
Virginia also recognizes surrogacy contracts executed without
judicial preauthorization. These contracts will be enforced only
to the extent that their provisions may be reformed to accom-
modate the statutory requirements. The major difference be-
tween a judicially preauthorized contract and a court-reformed
contract is the gestational surrogate's right to terminate the con-
tract.68 With respect to those contracts that have been preap-
proved by a court, intended parents are automatically
considered the parents of the resulting child unless the surrogate
chooses to terminate the contract within 180 days of becoming
pregnant. If a contract has been executed without court ap-
proval, however, the intended parents are not automatically
considered the parents of the resulting child. The gestational
surrogate, after a twenty-five-day waiting period, must relin-
quish her parental rights by signing a consent form before the
intended parents can be named as the child's parents on the
birth certificate.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(6) (Michie 1995).
67. Id. at § 20-160(B)(8).
68. Hofheimer, supra note 29, at 577-78 n.29.
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The Virginia surrogacy statute also prohibits any entity from
recruiting or inducing any surrogate or intended parent into a
surrogacy contract for compensation. This provision applies to
both judicially preauthorized and court-reformed surrogacy
agreements.69
While some states have made significant progress by attempt-
ing to tackle the difficult and complex issues raised by surrogacy,
serious problems remain. As previously mentioned, there is lit-
tle uniformity in the surrogacy legislation enacted by the various
states. What might be considered "baby selling," and therefore
against public policy, in one state is sound public policy in
another.
The real danger lies, however, with states like California,
where the legislature has yet to formulate an express public pol-
icy regarding surrogacy. Clearly, it is not difficult to envision
infertile couples from Arizona crossing the California border so
that they may produce a child through surrogacy with the confi-
dence that their agreement will be given effect.7 °
B. Federal Attempts to Restrict the Practice of Surrogacy
The United States has yet to enact federal legislation relating
to surrogacy arrangements and other impending bioethical is-
sues. This federal legislative vacuum has resulted in differing
and often conflicting action by state courts71 and state legisla-
tures72 as they attempt to resolve disputes stemming from the
new reproductive technologies.
In 1989, there were two attempts to pass federal legislation
that would prohibit or restrict surrogacy arrangements. While
the bills did not explicitly refer to the Baby M case, it is not
unreasonable to suspect that the legislation was in direct re-
sponse to the public furor over the issues presented by the case.
The first bill, referred to as the "Surrogacy Arrangements Act
of 1989," was introduced by Representative Thomas A. Luken
(D-Ohio).73 This legislative proposal sought to impose criminal
penalties upon anyone who "on a commercial basis knowingly
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165 (Michie 1995).
70. The Baby M case is at least one good example of an interstate surrogacy ar-
rangement: the Stems and the Whiteheads lived in New Jersey, the broker lived in
Michigan, the clinic was located in New York, and the adoption was slated to go
through in Florida.
71. See supra Parts IB-IE.
72. See supra Part IIA.
73. H.R. 275, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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makes, engages in, or brokers a surrogacy arrangement."74 Rep-
resentative Luken's bill would have also amended the Federal
Trade Commission Act to provide criminal penalties for anyone
who advertised services relating to surrogacy arrangements.
Although the bill had three additional cosponsors, it eventually
died in the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Another bill regarding surrogacy arrangements, entitled the
"Anti-Surrogate-Mother Act of 1989," was introduced by Rep-
resentative Robert K. Doman (R-Cal.).75 This proposal would
have criminalized all activities relating to surrogacy, including
the provision of medical assistance and the advertisement of
services with any connection to surrogate motherhood. Further-
more, unlike the prior bill, this legislation would have made
both commercial and noncommercial surrogacy contracts null
and void. Representative Dornan's bill eventually died in the
House Committee on the Judiciary, without any cosponsors.
The implications of this federal legislative vacuum, as it cur-
rently exists in the United States, are disturbing. The decisions
expressed by the California courts in Johnson demonstrate that
the issue can be analyzed from various viewpoints. Further,
state legislatures have enacted their own laws that either strictly
regulate the industry or allow it to flourish freely. Some states
have failed to even address the issue. This lack of consistency is
likely to create serious problems in the United States. Without
a uniform standard, certain states like California may become
havens for individuals desiring children through gestational sur-
rogacy. On the other'hand, a uniform regulatory scheme could
enable each citizen in every state to have the same opportunity
to produce a child through gestational surrogacy. This uniform
regulation would also reduce the risk of the exploitation and
76 secommercialization of women, as set standards would govern
the industry.
The United States is not alone in struggling with the issue of
the "biological mother." Just as reproductivity and biology tran-
scend international borders, so too do desires to raise children.
None of the issues discussed above is unique to the United
States.
74. Id. at § 2(a) (emphasis added).
75. H.R. 576, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
76. See infra Part IV.
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III. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The unresolved issues surrounding gestational surrogacy are
elevated from a national problem to an international problem
when other countries' laws (or lack thereof) are added to the
equation. As Barbara Katz Rothman recognizes in her article
entitled "On 'Surrogacy',""77 if just one state permits surrogacy
to exist within its borders, and there is no federal legislation
prohibiting it, that state may become a breeding ground for the
mass production of babies. This can also happen on an interna-
tional level, since, as Rothman notes, "[i]t is in the United States
that the rights of rich people to buy are most deeply held. 78
Rothman states that she used to envision "baby farms" located
in third-world countries, exporting babies to United States pur-
chasers. With most European countries outlawing surrogacy for
hire, the United States may soon be the logical place for the
budding international surrogacy industry.
A. Overview of IVF and Surrogacy Legislation in
Foreign Countries
There appears to be a growing international consensus in sup-
port of discouraging, if not outright prohibiting, commercial sur-
rogacy. At least eight countries, including Israel, Switzerland,
Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Norway, and Britain, specifi-
cally ban commercial surrogacy.79 However, there is little con-
sensus among the various nations with respect to regulating IVF
and noncommercial surrogacy.
Among the developed countries, Germany and Sweden have
some of the most restrictive legal codes on fertility practices.
Germany, for instance, prides itself on being one of the only
countries to ban the implantation of an egg that has not been
provided by the woman undergoing the treatment. A Decem-
ber 1990 law, concerned with the protection of the embryo and
the avoidance of split motherhood, stipulates that offenders or
those who abuse reproduction technology will be liable to a
prison term or fine. 0 Sweden, like Germany, passed restrictive
77. Barbara Katz Rothman, On 'Surrogacy', in JOHN ARRAS & BONNIE
STEINBOCK, ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 475 (4th ed. 1995).
78. Id. at 475.
79. Leo Uzych, The Mother of All Questions: How to Govern Surrogacy, PA. L. J.,
Mar. 8, 1993, at 2.
80. Improvised Guidelines on Motherhood's Brave New World, GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 5, 1994, at 9.
1996]
23
Krim: Beyond <i>Baby M<i>: International Perspectives on Gestational Su
Published by LAW eCommons, 1996
Annals of Health Law
fertility laws in the late 1980's. In particular, Sweden has
banned the use of either donated eggs or donated sperm; only
fertilization "between partners" is permissible. Sweden also
prohibits the anonymous donation of sperm. Men are required
"to disclose their names and a list of personal details," so that
when the children reach age eighteen, they are able to trace
their biological father.8' As a result of Sweden's strict fertility
laws, hundreds of Swedish women each year seek treatment in
Britain and Denmark, where laws are less restrictive.
France is not far behind Germany and Sweden in strictly regu-
lating IVF practices. A draft law being considered (as of the
time of this writing) by the French legislature would restrict IVF
to infertile "heterosexual" couples in a stable union. In reaction
to recent controversies in Britain and Italy, the government also
plans on banning the use of IVF by postmenopausal women.82
Australia is also in the process of updating its laws regarding
surrogacy and IVF. In 1984, Australia was in the forefront of
developing successful IVF programs, and became the first na-
tion to legislate specifically on the subject.83 Its laws have subse-
quently lagged behind developments in new reproductive
technology. Marie Tehan, Australia's Health Minister, supports
the existing prohibition on gay couples gaining access to IVF.
She also favors a complete ban on surrogacy under threat of
criminal penalties.84
In Canada, there is no comprehensive law in place, and no
entity, public or private, has overall responsibility in the area of
new reproductive technologies. Surrogacy agreements (or "pre-
conception arrangements," as they are called in Canada) are not
specifically outlawed in any province except Quebec. In Que-
bec, "the revised Civil Code states that all agreements for pro-
creation or gestation for payment are null and void. '85
On October 25, 1989, former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
appointed Dr. Patricia Baird, a geneticist at the University of
British Columbia, to head a national task force that would per-
form an in-depth study of current bioethical issues and recom-
mend government action. Dr. Baird and the Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Technologies ("Royal Commission")
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Julie-Anne Davies, Australia: Surrogate Mothers Face Bans, SUNDAY AGE
(Melbourne), Mar. 5, 1995, at 1.
84. Id.
85. Surrogacy Business Growing, CALGARY HERALD, Aug. 31, 1994, at Al.
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eventually spent four years and over $28 million addressing the
medical, legal, economic, and ethical issues arising from new re-
productive technologies such as IVF, surrogate motherhood,
and prebirth selection.
The result of the Royal Commission's extensive study was a
1275 page report released on November 30, 1993, entitled "Pro-
ceed With Care: The Final Report of the Royal Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies. '"86 While the Final Report
generally calls "for a 'regulatory framework' regarding the use
of new reproductive technologies," similar to Australia's, it ulti-
mately proposes a ban on commercial surrogacy and "the impo-
sition of criminal penalties on intermediaries." '8 7 The Final
Report's Summary states: "Preconception arrangements com-
modify reproduction and children, they have potential to exploit
women's vulnerability because of race, poverty, or powerless-
ness and leave women open to coercion. 88 The Royal Commis-
sion also called for the closing of sex-selection clinics and a ban
on the sale of human sperm, embryos, and fetal tissue.
Almost four years after publication of the Royal Commis-
sion's report, Canada's federal government is expected to enact,
in the summer of 1996, legislation that appears to adopt many of
the Royal Commission's recommendations. 89 The legislation is
expected to prohibit commercial surrogacy arrangements, as
well as the buying and selling of human eggs and embryos. The
legislation will also include fines for violating the law.
Both Britain and Israel generally support a less conservative
and noninterventionist stance on IVF and surrogacy. Accord-
ingly, each country has recently passed legislation facilitating the
use of IVF and other reproductive technology by infertile
couples.
In Britain, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of
1990 (HFEA)9° governs IVF treatments. The Act sets forth in
86. Note, Surrogate Motherhood Contracts: Should the British or Canadian Model
Fill the U.S. Legislative Vacuum?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 633, 674 (1993)
(citing Patricia Baird, Update: A Letter from the Chairperson, in ROYAL COMMISSION
ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, PROCEED WITH CARE: THE FINAL REPORT
OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES [hereafter FI-
NAL REPORT], Summary of Main Topics at 1 (1993).
87. FINAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 14.
88. FINAL REPORT, supra note 86, Summary & Highlights at 19.
89. Canada to Regulate Baby Trade, Xinhua News Agency, Apr. 18, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, NEws Library, XINHUA F'le.
90. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c.37, amended by Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c.33, § 156 (prohibition on use of cells from em-
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elaborate detail who is considered the "mother" and "father" in
a variety of situations.91 The HFEA granted the Human Fertili-
zation and Embryology Authority the power to license and reg-
ulate the 150 IVF clinics that now exist in Britain.92 While the
HFEA bans commercial surrogacy,93 it does not prohibit women
from serving as surrogates on a voluntary basis. Unlike the
French draft law, the HFEA does not prohibit the use of IVF by
single or lesbian women.
Under the HFEA, rather than going through conventional
adoption procedures, couples may apply for a "parental order,"
which gives them a much speedier, more informal answer.94 To
qualify, a couple "must be married, have paid no fees to the
surrogate other than expenses [directly related to the preg-
nancy], and at least one [of the intended parents] must be 'ge-
netically related' to the child. '9 5
In 1991, Israel followed Canada's example and appointed a
committee of experts to examine various aspects of IVF and sur-
rogacy in an effort to reevaluate its fertility laws. The commit-
tee comprised a retired district court judge, a gynecologist, a
sociologist, a philosopher, a social worker, a gynecologist/medi-
cal ethicist rabbi, and a psychologist. The committee's final re-
port was released in July 1994, and, unlike Canada's expert
committee, recommended the legalization of surrogate mother-
hood. While the majority of the committee members agreed
that they did not want to encourage couples to commission an-
other woman to have their baby, they felt the phenomenon was
"too common to be ignored by Israeli law." Other recommen-
dations by the committee included the appointment of an inter-
disciplinary board of experts to exclusively supervise all IVF and
surrogacy procedures; restricting the surrogate's payment to
those expenses directly associated with the pregnancy; and im-
mediate recognition of parental rights once the baby is born,
thereby avoiding the lengthy adoption process. Under the com-
bryos or foetuses); Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Disclosure of Information)
Act, 1992, c.54.
91. Id. at §§ 27-30.
92. Id. at § 8.
93. Id. at §§ 12(e), 13(5), 13(6).
94. Lucy Berrington, Surrogate Parents Cut Legal Red Tape, THE TIMES
(London), Feb. 25, 1995.
95. Id.
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mittee proposal, the surrogate would retain the right to change
her mind and keep the baby.96
In March 1996, the Israeli parliament passed a landmark bill
that legalized surrogacy arrangements, making Israel the first
country to have national legislation governing the practice of
surrogacy. The legislation requires the surrogate and the couple
"ordering" the child to sign a contractual agreement. Health
Minister Ephraim Sneh appointed a seven-member committee
(consisting of two gynecologists/obstetricians, a clinical psychol-
ogist, a public representative, a social worker, an internal
medicine specialist, and a clergyman) that will be responsible for
approving these contracts.97 The committee will be allowed to
approve surrogacy agreements between a commissioning couple
and a surrogate if they are "certain the deal was reached freely
by both sides, and there is no danger to the health of the mother
or to the health and the rights of the baby."98 The legislation
requires that the sperm be provided by the commissioning fa-
ther, and that the baby be conceived by IVF. With respect to
the surrogate, the legislation generally requires that she be an
unmarried, Israeli resident. She may be paid compensation for
her suffering and loss of time and income, as well as legal costs
and insurance. However, the payment of additional money is
prohibited. Finally, the legislation entitles the surrogate to
change her mind and keep the baby (subject to court approval),
or to abort the fetus if she so chooses (in accordance with ex-
isting abortion law).99
B. Surrogacy Issues in an Emerging Global Market
The lack of IVF or surrogacy regulation in many countries
promises to raise additional complex legal issues for courts to
address in the near future. For instance, as the number of inter-
national surrogacy arrangements increases, it is not difficult to
envision a custody dispute between genetic parents residing in
one country and the surrogate in another. The initial question
in such a dispute then becomes: "Whose law governs?" Is it the
law in the country in which the genetic parents reside, or the law
in the country in which the surrogate resides? Perhaps the focus
96. Judy Siegel, Experts Recommend Legalization of Surrogate Motherhood, JE-
RUSALEM POST, July 27, 1994, at 12.
97. Judy Siegel, Health Ministry Tackles TB, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 7, 1996, at 5.
98. Id.
99. Judy Siegel, Surrogate Mother Bill Must Soon Be Law, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
19, 1995, at 3.
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should be on the child. A court may apply the law of the coun-
try in which the child was either conceived or born, which may
not necessarily be the same. Thus, a court may ultimately be
forced to choose between the conflicting laws of four different
countries.
The number of cross-cultural surrogacy agreements being
formed is astounding, and for every reported international ar-
rangement, there are probably dozens that go unnoticed. In
Australia, at least sixty couples, and an unknown number of sin-
gle men, have inquired about obtaining babies through the In-
fertility Center of America, based in Indianapolis, Indiana. The
Center runs a surrogacy program that offers its services to infer-
tile couples from around the world. 100 It is estimated that the
Center has assisted in the production of over 500 babies for indi-
viduals and couples in over fifteen countries, including South
America, Saudi Arabia, and Australia. 10'
International surrogacy agreements may even be formed
without any face-to-face contact between the parties. For in-
stance, in one case, the sperm of a Japanese husband was air-
lifted to a San Francisco fertility clinic, and inseminated into
seventeen eggs donated by a twenty-one-year-old Chinese-
American student. Six of the eggs were subsequently implanted
in the womb of a thirty-year-old American Caucasian woman.
This arrangement resulted in "[t]he first surrogate delivery in-
volving three 'mothers' on both sides of the Pacific Ocean-the
legal Japanese mother, the U.S. donor of the egg, and another
American woman who gave birth to the baby.' 0 2
While the recent development of international surrogacy ar-
rangements has brought tremendous joy to infertile couples
around the world, it is not difficult to imagine a much darker
side to this new phenomenon. A British newspaper reported
that a British adoption specialist, currently under investigation
in Croatia for allegedly traveling across Eastern Europe to find
pregnant women-usually refugee victims of "ethnic cleans-
ing"-to persuade them to sign their unborn children over for
adoption in the United States, was also planning to exploit lib-
100. John Elder, Australia: U.S. Babies Sell Here For $60,000, SUNDAY AGE (Mel-
bourne), Feb. 19, 1995.
101. Id.
102. Three "Mothers" To Have Single Baby, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Nov. 18,
1994, at 12. Surrogate motherhood is illegal in Japan, but the Health and Welfare
Ministry cannot bar Japanese couples from going to the United States to take advan-
tage of the liberal surrogacy laws. Id.
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eral surrogacy laws in the United States by impregnating East-
ern European women with sperm from United States men,
supplied by courier service. He would then bring the surrogates
to the United States in the latter stages of their pregnancy so
that they could have their babies in American clinics. His busi-
ness proposal revealed that "he anticipated arranging '20 con-
current surrogates' who would live on a 'baby farm,' " possibly
in Hungary. In addition, it is alleged that this person harbored
"plans to link up with professional service groups 'world-wide'
and to set up additional surrogacy clinics in Cyprus and possibly
Russia. °1 0 3
As illustrated above, the consequences of the new reproduc-
tive technologies are not confined within the borders of one sin-
gle country. The fact that international surrogacy arrangements
have already been formed between citizens of different coun-
tries with different policies, rules, laws, and restrictions casts an
ominous cloud on the fate of the global market concerning ges-
tational surrogacy. As more individuals learn that gestational
surrogacy can become a profitable investment, the industry
could grow at an alarming rate without proper oversight. This
unexpected and uncontrolled growth in the industry could lead
to another significant problem: the exploitation and commer-
cialization of women.
IV. THE EXPLOITATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF
WOMEN: DIFFERING FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
Since the second wave of the feminist movement around 1910,
the principal aim of the movement has been for women to
achieve equality with men by gaining self-control over their bod-
ies. After all, women's bodies and reproductive capacities had,
for centuries, been used to control and oppress them. This com-
mon platform, however, is now being challenged by new repro-
ductive technologies. Some feminists are reconsidering this
basic goal of equality, prompting them to question whether the
movement's position on motherhood, choice, and similar issues
of significant concern to women ought to be reevaluated."° In
fact, the new reproductive technologies are viewed by some
103. Leonard Doyle, Dealer in Babies Planned a Global Market, INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 18, 1995, at 5.
104. Norma J. Wilder, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies:
The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1048 (1986).
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feminist writers as simply another way for men to exploit wo-
men's procreative power.
Feminists have traditionally been "pro-choice in their support
of a woman's right to choose abortion and contraception over
pregnancy... and to decide for themselves the manner and the
circumstances of childbirth.' 10 5 Accordingly, early feminist writ-
ers anticipating advances in reproductive technology embraced
the idea of having an expanded range of choices made available
to them. Some hailed these technologies as the savior of women
by liberating them from the burdens of childbearing. 10 6
More recently, however, some feminists have changed their
attitudes toward these new reproductive technologies, especially
surrogacy, fearing that surrogacy is another form of oppression
that will take away "choices" for some women. These commen-
tators "see surrogacy as a form of slavery or prostitution in
which the surrogate is exploited through the enticements of
money, the social expectation of self-sacrifice, or both. 10 7
Some feminists who view contemporary United States society as
still largely patriarchal fear the consequences if these new tech-
nologies are not controlled by women and are not used for the
interest of women. Some fear the medical profession, perceived
as male dominated and tending to serve the interests of males, is
gaining too much control over the issue.0 8
Gena Corea contends that since the beginning of the human
race, males have had a desire to possess women's procreative
power. 0 9 Regardless of whether one accepts this premise,
Corea makes an interesting connection between the laws in both
the United States and other countries, which early on gave wo-
men few maternal rights, and the new rules being created by the
reproductive technologies. She cites as an example laws that
gave husbands an absolute right to take children away from
their wives and even permitted them to bequeath guardianship
105. Id. at 1049.
106. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Femi-
nists, in Surrogate Motherhood 167, 167-68 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990) ("In the past two
decades, feminist policy arguments have refashioned legal policies on reproduction
and the family. A cornerstone of this development has been the idea that women
have a right to reproductive choice-to be able to contracept, abort, or get
pregnant.").
107. Note, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be An-
swered?, 68 IND. L J. 205, 211 (1992).
108. Wilder, supra note 104, at 1050.
109. GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 283-88 (1985).
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of the children to other males rather than to the wives. 110 She
contends that with the repeal of these antiquated laws, man has
found a sense of continuity in the new reproductive technolo-
gies, transforming the experience of motherhood, placing it
under male control, and "creating for women the same kind of
discontinuous reproductive experience men now have.""'
Gestational surrogacy, unlike traditional surrogacy arrange-
ments, has the dangerous potential to create a two-tiered class
of women primarily because it separates the genetic link be-
tween the surrogate and the child. Some fear that these technol-
ogies will be used by those with power and wealth to exploit
others since the surrogate's genes are not of concern to the in-
tended parents. In 1932, science fiction writer Aldous Huxley
had a vision of a "Brave New World" where family relationships
would be replaced by "hatcheries," reproduction would be con-
trolled by the state, and embryos "produced and monitored in
an artificial environment. ' 112 Less than a century later, this idea
is not as far-fetched as it once seemed.
Commentators do not agree on the appropriate response to
the concerns identified above. Some suggest that government
intervention in female reproductive decision making is neces-
sary in order "to protect the interests of women as a group. '"113
For example, Robyn Rowland, a contemporary feminist writer,
believes that "[t]o retain control over human experimentation,
women may have to consider state intervention of some kind in
the areas of research funding, research application and repro-
ductive rights- with all its inherent dangers .... We may have
to call for an end to research which would have helped infertile
women to conceive, in consideration of the danger to women as
a social group of loss of control over 'natural' childbearing
,,114
Other feminist writers, however, vehemently oppose govern-
ment intervention of any kind for fear of losing choices that they
now have. As Norma Wikler explains: "If one accepts that the
110. According to Corea, these laws were created by males to overcome the sense
of alienation they feel in the reproductive process and as a parent. Id. at 287-88.
111. Id. at 289.
112. Marvin A. Milich, In-vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medical Tech-
nology-Social Values=Legislative Solutions, 30 J. FAM. L. 875, 876 (1991/1992).
113. Wilder, supra note 104, at 1050-51.
114. Id. at 1051 (quoting R. Rowland, Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation
and the Issue of "Choice" in Sex Protection 14, 17 (Apr. 1984) (Paper presented at
the Second International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, entitled Women's
World: Strategies for Empowerment, in Gronigen, Netherlands)).
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government would not be violating the fundamental right to pri-
vacy by intervening in ways which Rowland and others now ad-
vocate, it is difficult to argue that it would be a violation of that
right for the government to intervene in another reproductive
practice, namely, abortion." 115
Commentators also differ in their opinions of whether surro-
gates should be allowed to be paid for their effort. Some argue
that paying a woman money for gestating and then relinquishing
a child is tantamount to turning women and children into com-
modities, treating the female reproductive capacity and the chil-
dren born of gestational surrogacy arrangements as products
that can be bought and sold. 16 Opponents of paid surrogacy
arrangements, such as Canadian Barbara Katz Rothman, also
equate surrogacy with "baby selling," which is prohibited by law
in Canada, the United States and most other countries. Roth-
man argues, as Chief Justice Wilentz did in the Baby M case,
that regardless of whether the payment made to the surrogate is
characterized as payment for her services or for her child, the
arrangement contemplates "the sale of a child, or, at the very
least, the sale of a mother's right to her child, the only mitigating
factor being that one of the purchasers is the father."' 17 She
critiques the way in which the capitalist system has created a
"market" for infertile couples with the development of surro-
gacy brokers who profit from the desires of these couples, often
earning as much, if not more, than the surrogates, finding offen-
sive the entire commercial surrogacy industry.1 8 She asserts
that the commercial surrogacy industry, including the American
Fertility Association, is selling guilt by intentionally portraying
the inability to bear children as negative, and by describing a
home without children as an "empty nest." 119 Others feel the
industry gives credence to the prejudice that children genetically
related to their parents are "more valuable" than adopted
children. 120
115. Id.
116. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1930-33
(1987).
117. Fay Faraday, Book Review, 10 CAN. J. FAM. L. 310, 313 (reviewing BAR-
BARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY
IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989)).
118. Id. at 314.
119. Id.
120. Anne Goodwin, Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo
Transplantation, and Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L. 0. 275, 283
(1992) (In analyzing the Johnson decisions, the author argued that "California's focus
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In contrast, proponents of paid surrogacy argue that surrogacy
arrangements are distinguishable from baby selling. They see
the payments not as compensation for giving up parental rights,
but as compensation for the surrogate's services in gestating the
fetus and undergoing labor. This view is reinforced by the fact
that surrogacy agreements provide for payments of equal
amounts throughout the pregnancy, so that the surrogate will
receive a prorated portion if she miscarries, and will receive the
full amount if she carries the pregnancy to term, even if the fetus
is stillborn. In fact, Lori Andrews, an ardent supporter of surro-
gacy rights, argues that if our society is going to permit surro-
gacy, then the focus should not be on banning payment, but on
making sure surrogates get paid more.
Feminist writers' views on new reproductive technologies are
across the spectrum. Gestational surrogacy and the related
technologies permit women who are unable to have or carry
their own children to realize the gift of life. They also create a
valuable source of money for women who are willing to act as
surrogates. On the other hand, they can lead to the unwar-
ranted exploitation of women and create a situation where men
are seen as attempting to control or dominate the lives of wo-
men. What is clear is that differing viewpoints create a forum to
make us all aware of the inherent dangers in the new reproduc-
tive technologies, and a uniform approach to minimizing those
dangers is needed to protect all individuals involved, whether
from different backgrounds, different states, or different
countries.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the United States to develop a compre-
hensive federal policy to address the new reproductive technolo-
gies, especially gestational surrogacy. The current patchwork of
state laws is no longer effective given the global surrogacy mar-
ket that is quickly emerging. In order to protect individual and
societal interests, legislation in this area must occur at the fed-
eral level. The first step is to initiate a public debate similar to
those that have taken place in Canada and Israel. The United
States can begin the debate by establishing an independent com-
on genetics to determine parental rights in gestational surrogacy arrangements raises
troublesome issues. . . .The decision in favor of genetic parents not only protects
infertile couples who hire gestational surrogates but also promotes the rapidly ex-
panding business of surrogacy brokerage.").
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mission to undertake a comprehensive review of the various is-
sues raised in this area and to propose federal legislation.
State laws such as New Hampshire's and Virginia's serve as
good models for regulating surrogacy, which is preferable to
prohibiting surrogacy altogether. Strict regulation and enforce-
ment is the best approach since it is consistent with our strongly
held belief in procreative choice. At the same time, a well-regu-
lated regime would prevent perversion or exploitation of the
technology to the detriment of the gestational surrogate, the in-
fertile couple, or the child. The recently enacted legislation in
Israel may also be used as a model for regulating surrogacy on a
national level.
Eventually, the United States must work with other countries
to develop an international code of ethics to safeguard the use
of IVF and related technologies. As long as one country allows
for unregulated surrogacy, the threat of baby trafficking and ex-
ploitation of women will exist.
Finally, IVF has moved quickly from experimental to clinical
status in response to the growing demand of infertile couples.
The number of fertility clinics has increased from 10 to over 150
within the last five years. Although minimum standards and
guidelines for fertility clinics have been produced by profes-
sional societies, clinics are not obligated to follow them, and
there is no mechanism for overseeing clinic claims or quality.
Accordingly, it is imperative that the federal government pro-
mulgate regulations that set standards, license, and closely mon-
itor the activities of fertility clinics throughout the United
States.
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